Relazioni Sindacali

Syllabus
The arbitration provisions in petitioner Eastern Associated Coal Corp.'s collective bargaining agreement with respondent union specify, inter alia, that Eastern must prove in binding arbitration that it has "just cause" to discharge an employee, or else the arbitrator will order the employee reinstated. James Smith worked for Eastern as a truck driver subject to Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations requiring random drug testing of workers engaged in "safety-sensitive" tasks. After each of two occasions on which Smith tested positive for marijuana, Eastern sought to discharge him. Each time, the union went to arbitration, and the arbitrator concluded that the drug use did not amount to "just cause" and ordered Smith's reinstatement on certain conditions. On the second occasion, Eastern filed suit to vacate the arbitrator's award. The District Court ordered the award's enforcement, holding that Smith's conditional reinstatement did not violate the strong regulation-based public policy against drug use by workers who perform safety-sensitive functions. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
HELD:
public policy considerations do not require courts to refuse to enforce an arbitration award ordering an employer to reinstate an employee truck driver who twice tested positive for marijuana.
(a) The Court assumes that the collective bargaining agreement itself calls for Smith's reinstatement, as the parties have granted the arbitrator authority to interpret the meaning of their contract's language, including such words as "just cause," see Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599, and Eastern does not claim here that the arbitrator acted outside the scope of his contractually delegated authority, see, e.g., Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38. Since the award is not distinguishable from the contractual agreement, the Court must decide whether a contractual reinstatement requirement would fall within the legal exception that makes unenforceable "a collective bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy." W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766. Any such policy must be "explicit," "well defined," and "dominant," and it must be "ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents, not from general considerations of supposed public interests." Ibid. The question is not whether Smith's drug use itself violates public policy, but whether the agreement to reinstate him does so.
(b) A contractual agreement to reinstate Smith with specified conditions does not run contrary to public policy. The District Court correctly articulated the standard set out in W. R. Grace and Misco and applied that standard to reach the right result. The public policy exception is narrow, and must satisfy the principles set forth in those cases. Moreover, where two political branches have created a detailed regulatory regime in a specific field, courts should approach with particular caution pleas to divine further public policy in that area. Eastern asserts that a public policy against reinstatement of workers who use drugs can be discerned from an examination of the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991 and DOT's implementing regulations. However, these expressions of positive law embody not just policies against drug use by employees in safety-sensitive transportation positions and in favor of drug testing, but also include a Testing Act policy favoring rehabilitation of employees who use drugs. And the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions must be read in light of background labor law policy that favors determination of disciplinary questions through arbitration when chosen as a result of labor-management negotiation. See, e.g., California Brewers Assn. v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 608. The award here is not contrary to these several policies, taken together, as it does not condone Smith's conduct or ignore the risk to public safety that drug use by truck drivers may pose, but punishes Smith by placing conditions on his reinstatement. It violates no specific provision of any law or regulation, but is consistent with DOT rules requiring completion of substance abuse treatment before returning to work and with the Act's driving license suspension requirements and its rehabilitative concerns. Moreover, the fact that Smith is a recidivist is not sufficient to tip the balance in Eastern's favor. Eastern's argument that DOT's withdrawal of a proposed "recidivist" rule leaves open the possibility that discharge is the appropriate penalty for repeat offenders fails because DOT based the withdrawal, not upon a determination that a more severe penalty was needed, but upon a determination to leave in place other remedies. The Court cannot find in the Act, the regulations, or any other law or legal precedent an explicit, well defined, dominant public policy to which the arbitrator's decision runs contrary.

188 F.3d 501 affirmed.
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and STEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS, J., joined.

Accordi collettivi, Sindacati, Salute umana, Sicurezza del lavoro - Collective Agreements, Trade Unions, Human Health, Safety at Work

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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION V. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, 527 U.S. 229 (1999)
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus
The day after enacting the Inspector General Act (IGA), which created an Office of Inspector General (OIG) in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and other federal agencies, Congress enacted the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS), which, inter alia, permits union participation at an employee examination conducted "by a representative of the agency" if the employee believes that the examination will result in disciplinary action and requests such representation, 5 U.S.C. ß 7114(a)(2)(B). When NASA's OIG (NASA-OIG) began investigating a NASA employee's activities, a NASA-OIG investigator interviewed the employee and permitted, inter alios, the employee's union representative to attend. The union subsequently filed a charge with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority), alleging that NASA and its OIG had committed an unfair labor practice when the investigator limited the union representative's participation in the interview. In ruling for the union, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that the OIG investigator was a "representative" of NASA within ß 7114(a)(2)(B)'s meaning, and that the investigator's behavior had violated the employee's right to union representation. On review, the Authority agreed and granted relief against both NASA and NASA-OIG. The Eleventh Circuit granted the Authority's application for enforcement of its order.
HELD:
a NASA-OIG investigator is a "representative" of NASA when conducting an employee examination covered by ß 7114(a)(2)(B). Pp. GO>233-246.
(a) Contrary to NASA's and NASA-OIG's argument, ordinary tools of statutory construction, combined with the Authority's position, lead to the conclusion that the term "representative" is not limited to a representative of the "entity" that collectively bargains with the employee's union. By its terms, ß 7114(a)(2)(B) refers simply to representatives of "the agency," which, all agree, means NASA. The Authority's conclusion is consistent with the FSLMRS and, to the extent the statute and congressional intent are unclear, the Court may rely on the Authority's reasonable judgment. See, e.g., Federal Employees v. Department [527 U.S. 230] of Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 98-100. The Court rejects additional reasons that NASA and NASA-OIG advance for their narrow reading.
(b) The IGA does not preclude, and in fact favors, treating OIG personnel as representatives of the agencies they are duty-bound to audit and investigate. The IGA created no central office or officer to supervise, direct, or coordinate the work of all OIGs and their respective staffs. Other than congressional committees and the President, each Inspector General has no supervisor other than the head of the agency of which the OIG is part. Congress certainly intended that the OIGs would enjoy a great deal of autonomy, but an OIG's investigative office, as contemplated by the IGA, is performed with regard to, and on behalf of, the particular agency in which it is stationed. See 5 U.S.C. App. ß ß 2, 4(a), 6(a)(2). Any potentially divergent interests of the OIGs and their parent agencies -- e.g., an OIG has authority to initiate and conduct investigations and audits without interference from the agency head, ß 3(a) -- do not make NASA-OIG any less a NASA representative when it investigates a NASA employee. Furthermore, not all OIG examinations subject to ß 7114(a)(2)(B) will implicate an actual or apparent conflict of interest with the rest of the agency, and, in many cases, honest cooperation can be expected between an OIG and agency management. Pp. GO>237-243.
(c) NASA's and NASA-OIG's additional policy arguments against applying ß 7114(a)(2)(B) to OIG investigations -- that enforcing ß 7114(a)(2)(B) in situations similar to this case would undermine NASA-OIG's ability to maintain the confidentiality of investigations, and that the Authority has construed ß 7114(a)(2)(B) so broadly in other instances that it will impair NASA-OIG's ability to perform its responsibilities -- are ultimately unpersuasive. It is presumed that Congress took account of the relevant policy concerns when it decided to enact the IGA and, on that statute's heels, ß 7114(a)(2)(B).
(d) That the investigator in this case was acting as a NASA representative for ß 7114(a)(2)(B) purposes makes it appropriate to charge NASA-OIG, as well as its parent agency, with responsibility for ensuring that investigations are conducted in compliance with the FSLMRS.

120 F.3d 1208 affirmed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and O'CONNOR and SCALIA, JJ., joined, post. [527 U.S. 231]

Sindacati, Rappresentanti dei lavoratori, Servizi di ispezione - Trade Unions, Workers' Representatives, Inspection Services

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NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES , LOCAL 1309, V. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, 526 U.S. 86 (1999)
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus
As relevant here, the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (Statute) requires federal agencies and their employees' unions to "meet and negotiate in good faith for the purposes of arriving at a collective bargaining agreement," 5 U.S.C. ß 7114(a)(4); and creates the Federal Labor Relations Authority, giving it broad adjudicatory, policymaking, and rulemaking powers to implement the Statute, ßß 7104, 7105. The Authority initially held that ß 7114(a)(4)'s good faith bargaining requirement does not extend to union-initiated proposals during the term of the basic contract. The D.C. Circuit disagreed, and, in response, the Authority reversed its position. In this suit, a federal employees' union proposed including in its basic contract with a subagency of the Department of the Interior (Agency) a provision obligating the Agency to negotiate at the union's request, about mid-term matters not in the original contract. Relying on the Fourth Circuit's view that union-initiated mid-term bargaining is inconsistent with the Statute, the Agency refused to accept, or bargain about, the proposed clause. However, the Authority ordered the Agency to bargain. The Fourth Circuit set aside that order, holding that the Statute prohibits such a provision.
HELD:
the Statute delegates to the Authority the legal power to determine whether parties must engage in mid-term bargaining or bargaining about mid-term bargaining. Pp. GO>91-101.
(a) The Statute itself does not resolve the mid-term bargaining question. Section 7114(a)(4)'s language is sufficiently ambiguous or open on the point as to require judicial deference to reasonable interpretation or elaboration by the agency charged with the Statute's execution. Such ambiguity is inconsistent both with the Fourth Circuit's absolute reading that the Statute prohibits mid-term bargaining and with the D.C. Circuit's similarly absolute, but opposite, reading. It is perfectly consistent, however, with the conclusion that Congress delegated to the [526 U.S. 87] Authority the power to determine whether, when, where, and what sort of mid-term bargaining is required. This conclusion is supported by the Statute's delegation of rulemaking, adjudicatory, and policymaking powers to the Authority, and by precedent recognizing the similarity of the Authority's public sector and the National Labor Relations Board's private sector roles, see Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89,97.
(b) For similar reasons, the Statute also grants the Authority leeway in answering the question whether an agency must bargain end-term about including in the basic labor contract a mid-term bargaining clause. The Authority's judgment that the parties must bargain over such a provision was occasioned by the D.C. Circuit's holding that the Statute imposes a duty to bargain mid-term. Since the Statute does not resolve the question of mid-term bargaining, nor the related question of bargaining about mid-term bargaining, the Authority should have the opportunity to consider these questions aware that the Statute permits, but does not compel, the conclusions it reached.

132 F.3d 157, vacated and remanded.
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., joined, and in which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined as to Part I, post. [526 U.S. 88]

Cases citing this case:
NASA v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 527 U.S. 229 (1999)

Accordi collettivi, Sindacati - Collective Agreements, Trade Unions

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WRIGHT V. UNIVERSAL MARITIME SERVICE CORP., 525 U.S. 70 (1998)
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus
Petitioner Wright, a longshoreman, was subject to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and a Longshore Seniority Plan, both of which contained an arbitration clause. When respondents refused to employ him following his settlement of a claim for permanent disability benefits for job-related injuries, Wright filed this suit, alleging discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The District Court dismissed the case without prejudice because Wright had failed to pursue the arbitration procedure provided by the CBA. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
HELD:
The CBA's general arbitration clause does not require Wright to use the arbitration procedure for alleged violation of the ADA.
(a) The Fourth Circuit's conclusions that the CBA arbitration clause encompassed a statutory claim under the ADA and was enforceable bring into focus the tension between two lines of this Court's case law. Compare, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49-51, with, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26. However, it is unnecessary to resolve the question of the validity of a union-negotiated waiver of employees' statutory rights to a federal forum, since it is apparent, on the facts and arguments presented here, that no such waiver has occurred.
(b) Petitioner's ADA claim is not subject to the presumption of arbitrability this Court has found in ß 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947. That presumption does not extend beyond the reach of the principal rationale that justifies it -- i.e., that arbitrators are in a better position than courts to interpret the terms of a CBA. See, e.g., AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 650. The dispute here ultimately concerns not the application or interpretation of any CBA, but the meaning of a federal statute, the ADA. Although ordinary textual analysis of a CBA may show that matters beyond the interpretation and application of contract terms are subject to arbitration, they will not be presumed to be so.
(c) In order for a union to waive employees' rights to a federal judicial forum for statutory antidiscrimination claims, the agreement to arbitrate such claims must be clear and unmistakable. Cf., e.g., Metropolitan [525 U.S. 71] Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708. The CBA's arbitration clause is very general, providing only for arbitration of "[m]atters under dispute," and the remainder of the contract contains no explicit incorporation of statutory antidiscrimination requirements. For similar reasons, there is no clear and unmistakable waiver in the Longshore Seniority Plan. This Court does not reach the question whether such a waiver would be enforceable.

121 F.3d 702 vacated and remanded.
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. [525 U.S. 72]

Accordi collettivi, Sindacati, Persone portatrici di handicap, Incidenti sul lavoro - Collective Agreements, Trade Unions, Persons with Disabilities, Accident at Work

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UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS V. BROWN GROUP, INC., 517 U.S. 544 (1996)
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus
Petitioner union filed this suit, alleging that respondent company began to lay off workers in connection with the closing of one of its plants before giving the union the closing notice required by the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (the WARN Act), and seeking backpay for each of its affected members. The District Court dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the suit was barred because the union failed to meet the third part of the test for determining associational standing.
HELD:
1. The WARN Act grants a union authority to sue for damages on behalf of its members, North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 31; the writ of certiorari therefore was not improvidently granted.
2. The union has standing to bring this action.
(a) Under modern associational standing doctrine, an organization may sue to redress its members' injuries when: "(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343. The requirement of individual participation has been understood to preclude associational standing when an organization seeks damages on behalf of its members. The question here is whether a bar to the union's suit found in this third prong of the test is constitutional and absolute, or prudential and malleable by Congress. The Court of Appeals apparently concluded that the test's third prong is of constitutional character, for it denied standing even though the WARN Act permits the union to sue for its members' damages.
(b) The test's first prong is grounded in Article III as an element of the constitutional case or controversy requirement. Resort to general principles, however, leads to the conclusion that the third prong is a prudential impediment that Congress may abrogate. Hunt's requirement [517 U.S. 545] that an organization suing as representative include at least one member with standing to present, in his or her own right, the claim pleaded by the association is an Article III necessity for the an association's representative suit. Hunt's second prong is complementary to the first, because it raises an assurance that the association's litigators will themselves have a stake in the resolution of the dispute, and thus be in a position to serve as the defendant's natural adversary. But once an association has satisfied Hunt's first and second prongs assuring adversarial vigor in pursuing a claim for which member Article III standing exists, it is difficult to see a constitutional necessity for anything more.
The third prong is best seen as focusing on matters of administrative convenience and efficiency, not on elements of a case or controversy. Circumstantial evidence of that prong's prudential nature is seen in the wide variety of other contexts in which a statute, federal rule, or accepted common law practice permits one person to sue on behalf of another, even where damages are sought. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. ß 2000e-5(f)(1).

50 F.3d 1426, reversed and remanded.
SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Cases citing this case:
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998)
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997)

Sindacati - Trade Unions

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INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA V. BAGWELL, 512 U.S. 821 (1994)
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

Syllabus
A month after enjoining petitioners (collectively, the union) from conducting unlawful strike-related activities against certain mining companies, a Virginia trial court held a contempt hearing, fined the union for its disobedience, and announced that the union would be fined for any future breach of the injunction. In subsequent contempt hearings, the court levied against the union over $64,000,000 in what it termed coercive, civil fines, ordering most of the money to be paid to the Commonwealth and the counties affected by the unlawful activities. After the strike was settled, the court refused to vacate the fines owed to the Commonwealth and counties, concluding that they were payable in effect to the public. Ultimately, it appointed respondent Bagwell to act as Special Commissioner to collect the unpaid fines. The Virginia Court of Appeals reversed and ordered that the fines be vacated. The Virginia Supreme Court, reversing in its turn, rejected petitioners' contention that the fines were criminal and could not be imposed absent a criminal trial.
HELD:
The serious contempt fines imposed here were criminal, and constitutionally could be imposed only through a jury trial.
(a) A criminal contempt fine is punitive, and can be imposed only through criminal proceedings, including the right to jury trial. A contempt fine is considered civil and remedial if it either coerces a defendant into compliance with a court order or compensates the complainant for losses sustained. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 303-304. Where a fine is not compensatory, it is civil only if the contemnor has an opportunity to purge, such as with per diem fines and fixed, suspended fines.
(b) Most contempt sanctions share punitive and coercive characteristics, and the fundamental question underlying the distinction between civil and criminal contempts is what process is due for the imposition of any particular contempt sanction. Direct contempts can be penalized summarily in light of the court's substantial interest in maintaining order and because the need for extensive factfinding and the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation are reduced. Greater procedural protections are afforded for sanctions of indirect contempts. Certain indirect [512 U.S. 822] contempts are particularly appropriate for imposition through civil proceedings, including contempts impeding the court's ability to adjudicate the proceedings before it and those contempts involving discrete, readily ascertainable acts. For contempts of more complex injunctions, however, criminal procedures may be required.
(c) The mere fact that the contempt fines here were announced in advance did not render them civil. Criminal laws generally provide notice of the sanction to be imposed, and the union's ability to avoid the contempt fines was indistinguishable from the ability of any citizen to avoid a criminal sanction. Other considerations confirm that the fines challenged here are criminal. Neither the parties nor the Commonwealth's courts have suggested that the fines are compensatory. The union's sanctionable conduct did not occur in the court's presence or otherwise implicate the core of the judicial contempt power, where lesser protections may be appropriate. Nor did the union's contumacy involve simple, affirmative acts, where the sanctions' force is primarily coercive and elaborate factfinding is not required. Instead the court levied fines for widespread, ongoing, out-of-court violations of a complex injunction, effectively policing the union's compliance with an entire code of conduct the court itself imposed. The contumacy lasted many months and spanned several counties, and the fines assessed were serious. Under these circumstances, disinterested factfinding and evenhanded adjudication were essential, and the union was entitled to a criminal jury trial.

244 Va. 463, 423 S. E. 2d 349, reversed.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, II-C, and III, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Part II-B, in which STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opinion, post. GINSBURG, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., joined, post. [512 U.S. 823]

Cases citing this case:
Williams v. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc., 520 U.S. 1133 (1997)
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997)

Accordi collettivi, Sindacati - Collective Agreements, Trade Unions

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UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO-CLC V. RAWSON, 495 U.S. 362 (1990)
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF IDAHO

Syllabus
Respondents, deceased miners' survivors, filed a state law wrongful death action in Idaho state court against petitioner Union, the miners' exclusive bargaining agent, alleging that the miners' deaths in an underground fire were proximately caused by the Union's fraudulent and negligent acts in connection with mine safety inspections conducted by its representatives pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement with the mine's operator. On remand from a State Supreme Court decision that the claims were not preempted by federal labor law, the trial court granted summary judgment for the Union. It found that the record was devoid of evidence supporting the fraud claim, and urged the State Supreme Court to reconsider its decision that the negligence claim was not preempted. The State Supreme Court upheld the trial court's summary judgment on the fraud claim, but again concluded that respondents' negligence claim was not preempted. Distinguishing this Court's decision in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 -- which held that a state law tort action against an employer may be preempted by ß 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, if the duty to the employee that was violated by the tort is created by a collective bargaining agreement and without existence independent of the agreement -- the court found that the instant agreement's provisions did "not require interpretation, . . . but rather . . . determine[d] only the nature and scope of the Union's duty." This Court vacated the State Supreme Court's judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Electrical Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, which extended Allis-Chalmers to a tort suit by an employee against her union. On remand, the State Supreme Court distinguished Hechler on the ground that, there, the alleged duty of care arose from the collective bargaining agreement, whereas, here, the Union's duty to perform the inspection reasonably arose from the fact of the inspection itself rather than the fact that the provision for the Union's participation in the inspection was contained in the labor contract. Since it was conceded that the Union undertook to inspect, the court noted, the sole issue was whether that inspection was negligent under state tort law. [495 U.S. 363]
HELD:
1. Respondents' tort claim is preempted by ß 301. The claim cannot be described as independent of the collective bargaining agreement, since the Union's representatives were participating in the inspection process pursuant to that agreement's provisions. Thus, if the Union failed to perform a duty in connection with the inspection, it was a duty arising out of the agreement signed by the Union as the miners' bargaining agent, not a duty of reasonable care owed to every person in society. Preemption by federal law cannot be avoided by characterizing the Union's negligence as a state law tort.
2. Respondents may not maintain a ß 301 suit against the Union.
(a) Mere negligence, even in the enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement, does not state a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation, which is a purposely limited check on the arbitrary exercise of union power. While a union may assume a responsibility toward employees by accepting a duty of care through a collective bargaining agreement, Hechler, supra, at 860, if an employee claims that a union owes him a more far-reaching duty, he must be able to point to language in the agreement specifically indicating an intent to create obligations enforceable against the union by the individual employees. Nothing in the agreement at issue suggests that it creates such obligations, since the pertinent part of the agreement consists of agreements between the Union and the employer, and is enforceable only by them.
(b) Moreover, under traditional principles of contract interpretation, respondents have no claim, for, as third-party beneficiaries, they have no greater rights in the agreement than does the promisee, the employer. Here, the employer has no enforceable right as promisee. The agreement provisions respondents rely on are not promises made by the Union to the employer. Rather, the limited surrender of the employer's exclusive authority over mine safety is a concession made by the employer to the Union.
(c) Although respondents' claim that the Union had committed fraud on the membership in violation of state law might implicate the duty of fair representation, respondents did not cross-petition for review of the State Supreme Court's holding that summary judgment was properly entered on this claim.

115 Idaho 785, 770 P.2d 794, reversed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., [495 U.S. 364] filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and SCALIA, J., joined, post.

Accordi collettivi, Sindacati, Rappresentanti dei lavoratori, Servizi di ispezione, Miniere, Incidenti sul lavoro, Sanzioni - Collective Agreements, Trade Unions, Workers' Representatives, Inspection Services, Mines, Accident at Work, Penalties